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Introduction
Respect for individual autonomy, expressed in the concept
of informed consent, is the basic ethical principle in re-
search with humans. Many ICU patients are unable to give
consentasaconsequenceofmentalincapacity,andthiscan
be further complicated in emergency situations, in which
treatment needs to be initiated without delay. Various ap-
proaches are used as surrogate to subject consent: waiver
of consent, consent by an independent physician and de-
ferred consent. Deferred consent involves randomization
at the investigator’s discretion according to criteria that
have been explicit during ethical review of the protocol,
followed by the request for patient’s (deferred subject con-
sent) orrepresentative’s(deferredproxyconsent)informed
consentinalaterphase.Severalemergencytrialshaveused
deferred consent [1, 2, 3, 4].
During the enrolment process in an ongoing Dutch
multi-centre randomized controlled trial using deferred
consent the situation arose that no deferred (subject or
proxy) consent was obtained from patients who died early
after start of the study. Should data of these patients be
used or not? In this article we analyse this practical and
ethical problem.
The “Early Lactate-Directed Therapy on the ICU”
study as an example
To evaluate the efﬁcacy of early lactate-directed therapy
two of the authors (T.C.J., J.B.) are currently conducting
a multi-centre trial. Patients eligible for inclusion are ran-
domly allocated to either 8h of early lactate-directed ther-
apy or control group therapy. Since early timing of goal-
directed therapy is essential [5, 6], patients are random-
ized immediately after the ﬁrst available lactate level, re-
sulting in a very short inclusion time window. The Ethics
Committee approved the use of deferred consent, referring
to the Dutch revised “Medical Research in Human Sub-
jects Act” [7]. Study procedures are temporarily under-
taken without consent, and, as soon as possible, written
consent from the patient or legal representative is sought.
Until December 2006 we had collected data from
115 patients (Fig. 1). In 11.7% of cases (13/111) consent
could not be obtained due to early death (<72h, before
relatives could be approached). Given the predicted sam-
ple size of 350 patients, not using data of these patients
would result in an additional requirement of 41 patients.
In 2.7% of cases (3/111) relatives could not be identiﬁed,
or contact was lost. In 2.7% (3/111) relatives refused895
Fig.1 Flow-chart of the process of deferred consent in enrolled patients in the "Early Lactate-Directed Therapy on the ICU" study
(February–December 2006)
consent, and these patients were withdrawn from analysis.
Median randomization-to-consent time was 1 day (n=92,
interquartile range 0–3 days).
The Ethics Committee of the coordinating centre was
asked for a judgement on the use of already obtained data
of patients who died before consent could be sought. Our
proposal to use the data was rejected.
Previous experience in patients who died before
obtained deferred consent
Some emergency studies using deferred consent have
reported the use of data from patients who died early.
In the PAC-man trial using deferred consent [2] consent
was sought from patients who regained consciousness
(deferred subject consent), regardless of whether relative’s
assent was obtained earlier. It was stated that “if the
patient’s died without regaining mental competency, the
patient’s data were included in the trial analysis” [8].
Fifty percent (249/500) of the patients died with obtained
relative’s assent (not consent) but without obtained subject
deferred consent. Nine percent (45/500) died with neither
relative’sassentnorsubjectdeferredconsent.Data ofthese
patients were included in the analysis. In another trial
74% of patients (220/300) were included under deferred
consent [1] and were asked consent as soon as possible.
This was done only in survivors, suggesting that if patients
died before regaining consciousness, data were used [9].
As overall 28-day mortality was high (58%), a substantial
part of the data were probably analysed without consent.
In another trial [4], diligent attempts to contact the relative
were made and an independent physician was consulted
before it was deemed necessary to waive consent. If
attempts to contact relatives continued to be unsuccessful,
or if the patient died before relatives could be contacted,
the institutional review board was notiﬁed, and data were
used. Summarizing, in these studies [1, 2, 4], data were896
used if the patient died before deferred consent was
obtained, and reasonable efforts were made to obtain
permission from a patient representative.
Ethical considerations
Guiding ethical principles for medical research are respect
for patient autonomy, protection against discomfort, risk,
harm and exploitation and the prospect of beneﬁt. Taking
our lactate study as point of departure for analysis, some
questions remain:
Why is deferred consent necessary?
For optimal respect of patient’s autonomy,seeking consent
before study participation is preferable. Principle 1 of the
Nuremberg Code states that the primary consideration in
research is the subject’s voluntary consent, which is “ab-
solutely essential” (Military Tribunal, 1947, United States
vs.KarlBrandt,“TrialsofwarcriminalsbeforetheNurem-
berg Military Tribunals under control counsil law no. 10:
the medical case”). Unfortunately, in emergency ICU re-
search this is often not possible, as illustrated by the PAC-
man trial in which only 2.6% of patients could consent be-
fore starting the study [8]. Emergency research represents
an exceptional situation in which the mechanisms of the
consent process may need to be modiﬁed, but the social
contract between researcher and research subject must be
respected in order to provide a safeguard against unethical
research. Despite the importance of the subject’s voluntary
consent or its various surrogate procedures, the question
remains as to whether arguments in favour of not using
data, are outweighed by the following arguments in favour
of using data in such extraordinary case when patients die
early and deferred consent would have to be sought from
bereaved proxies.
Is proxy consent valid in emergency situations?
Uncertainty exists whether a substituted judgement on
what a patient would have decided would concur with
the patient’s preferences. Some have shown that most
patients conﬁrmed the judgement made earlier by the
relatives [8]. However, surrogate decision making for
critical care research resulted in false-positive consent
rates of 16–20% [10, 11]; a recent review showed overall
inaccuracyof 32%[12].Thevalidity of proxyconsentmay
be further reducedin emergencysituations.Overwhelming
emotions may decrease validity. Most proxies seem to
make decisions based on what they hope will happen
(beneﬁt of therapy), not taking in consideration what is
a real prospect (possible non-beneﬁt and research-related
burden) [13]. It is of ethical and fundamental concern that
relatives cannot make balanced decisions in this period
of uncertainty. If the risk exists that consent by relatives
in emergency ICU situations reﬂects more a regime of
bureaucracy (consent is required, we need a signature),
rather than true ethical concern (by obtaining consent the
relatives act in the patients interests) [14], how can we
value consent in the tragic situation in which the patient
has died?
Do we harm the patients by using the obtained data?
Can we estimate how many patients or relatives would
refuse the use of data obtained in acute situations
without consent? Two studies evaluating emergency
therapies [15, 16] used waiver of consent with subsequent
written notiﬁcation. Survival hospital-discharge rates were
8% (43/538) and 17% (14/82). Only 0.4% (2/538) and 0%
(0/82) were withdrawn at relatives request after written
notiﬁcation [17]. In the PAC-man trial 3.3% of survivors
(6/181) refused consent [8]. In our lactate study 2.7%
(3/111) of patients or relatives refused study participation
after randomization. It seems that very few patients or
relatives refuse consent for using already obtained data in
emergency situations. Do we harm patient’s interests by
using data without consent? The data in our lactate-study,
consisting of regular data as survival, consumption of
health care resources, laboratory values and haemody-
namics data, are patient-identiﬁable only by the principal
investigator. Given privacy-respecting handling of data
and thorough conﬁdentiality, patient’s interests are not
harmed by using the data.
Would we introduce selection bias by not using the data?
Patients who die early are the most severely ill (100%
mortality) and excludingthem can reduceexternalvalidity,
jeopardize the balance between study arms and inﬂuence
the effect of the intervention as this may differ in patients
who die early than in survivors or those who die later.
The intention-to-treat principle, recommended in the ICH
E9 [18], implies that the primary analysis should include
all randomized subjects. Compliance with this principle
would require complete follow-up of all subjects for study
outcomes. Not using study data of patients who died
early would thus hamper the intention-to-treat principle.
Although the Registry of the Canadian Stroke Network
used a different consent procedure than our study, it does
show that important selection biases can be found if many
patients died or left the hospital before they could be
approached for consent [19]. The in-hospital mortality
rate was much lower among enrolled patients (6.9%)
than among those eligible for study participations but not
enrolled (21.7%). Hence study patients were no longer
representative of typical stroke patients. Other studies897
showed that absolute requirements to obtain consent have
led to selection biases in retrospective studies based on
chart review [20, 21] and decreased enrolment in regist-
ries [22]. These concerns probably apply equally to the
critical care/emergency medicine context, but additional
data in this area would be useful. After completion of our
lactate study we plan to compare study results including
or excluding data from patients who died before deferred
consent could be obtained. By doing this the hypothesis
posed in this article will be tested, that not using these data
will introduce selection bias, make randomization arms
asymmetrical and jeopardize trial results.
Do future patients beneﬁt from the obtained data?
Clinical research plays an important role in obtaining
knowledge for improvement in therapy, patient safety and
progress in medicine. Future patients will beneﬁt from
critical care research results of today. If data obtained
in emergency ICU situations without consent cannot be
used, and selection bias is thus introduced, study results
may be ruined and future patients be harmed. Degrading
a study in this fashion also devalues the contribution made
by subjects who do consent to take part in the study,
which is an ethically undesirable consequence. While this
premise cannot provide an argument for including data
when research subjects expressly deny consent, it does
make an ethically valid case for including data where
such explicit denial of consent does not exist. Notwith-
standing this discussion it should not be forgotten that the
society’s interests in medical progress may never overrule
potential burden and risks for patients, as enshrined in the
Nuremburg Code [23].
What is the burden for the relatives?
Health care providers have a prima facie duty to relieve
and prevent suffering (harm, burden) of patients, their
relatives and society. Confronting relatives again with
the event that their loved one died on the ICU can be
seen as harm or burden. Concerning our lactate study,
the local Ethics Committee acknowledged this psycho-
logical burden. If we can say that confronting bereaved
relatives represents additional burden, which we have the
duty to relieve or prevent, it seems morally correct to
adopt policies that prevent seeking deferred consent from
proxy’s after their relatives death. Extending the time
period of seeking consent could theoretically reduce the
burden. However, obtaining written consent a long time
after the patient has died can be impractical (telephone
consent is not allowed and it is questionable whether
the agreeing relative will take effort to reply a request
for written consent), and, more importantly, actively
approaching relatives for seeking consent in a “fatal
medical research case” would still be a real burden for the
relatives.
Is the individual’s (or proxy’s) decision about the privacy
of their medical information binding?
The individual’s decision (whether made by the individual
him/herself or his/her proxy) is not absolutely binding.
In certain situations it is permissible to use personal
information even though the individual has not allowed
it. This point is supported by principles in ethics and
law: (a) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights permits personal information to be used without
consent (even if the individual expressly objects) if
the processing is necessary and proportionate for “the
protection of health”. This is generally understood to
include some medical research projects. Additionally (b),
the European Union Data Protection Directive allows
member states to adopt laws which allow personal data
to be processed for scientiﬁc purposes without consent
provided sufﬁcient safeguards apply. Lastly (c), the United
Kingdom Data Protection Act of 1998 permits such
processing if it is necessary and proportionate for the
goals of medical research. Although there is little case
law, the courts would likely consider the following factors
when deciding whether the twin principles of necessity
and proportionality have been met include: the practicality
of seeking consent (or proxy consent), the importance
of answering the research question, alternative ways of
answering this question, the degree of anonymization of
the data, the practicality of discarding individuals’ data,
the implications of discarding the data (selection bias) and
the degree of distress caused to the individual or proxy by
ignoring their wishes.
Deferring consent: how long do circumstances continue to
prevent the giving of consent?
In the lactate trial study procedures were allowed for
as long circumstances continue to prevent the giving of
consent [7]. The local Ethics Committee interprets such
a circumstance as physical absence of the patient’s relative
arguing that, as soon as relatives arrive, this circumstance
is no longer valid, and hence consent should immediately
be sought. Given that seeking proxy consent in emergency
conditions is questionably valid (see “Is proxy consent
valid in emergency situations?”), and it is a burden for the
relatives to consent for their dead relative (see “What is
the burden for the relatives?”), it could be seen in a way
that in fact the circumstance continues that prevents the
giving of consent.
To preventinvestigators’abuse of this ongoingcircum-
stance a time limit for seeking consent could be suggested.
In a conducted survey among investigators active in898
the ﬁeld of traumatic brain injury, opinions concerning
the most appropriate time for requesting proxy deferred
consent, were investigated (Fig. 2). Peak preferences of
time limits were “less than 24 h” and “no limit”. Adding
the percentages, 68% (12% +8% +29% +19%) of the
respondents believed that deferred consent should be
asked within 72 h after starting the study, while 32% (1%
+26% +5%) felt that the time limit should be longer than
72h (or even that consent was not at all required) [14].
Comparison with other countries in the European
Union
The United Kingdom has recently introduced legislative
and regulatory provision for emergency research. In
principle, these provisions allow for proxy and deferred
consent, and are included in the Mental Capacity Act 2005
(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/20050009.htm)
and an amendment (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/
20062984.htm) to the UK Clinical Trials regulations.
Italian implementation of the European Clinical Trial
Directive 2001/20/EC enables enrolment of incapacitated
patients in clinical trials, and deferred consent is required
according to the ethics committee’s approval [24].
InAustrianlaw, whichallowsproxyconsentinthe case
of mental incapacity, there is a special provision regarding
“emergency” situations in which inclusion of a patient can
take place without proxy consent. The time period of the
emergency is not considered as long as it takes to appoint
a legal representative, but as long as the speciﬁc emer-
gency is a medical emergency. If the patient regains the
ability to consent, he/she is to inform without delay and
to ask consent for further participation. Participation of
Fig.2 Survey among
investigators active in the ﬁeld of
traumatic brain injury. Within
which time period should proxy
deferred consent be obtained or
information provided? (n=77)
[14]
such patients must be with the prospect of a potential dir-
ect beneﬁt, “which exceeds the risks”. Thus the prospect
of any kind of group beneﬁt is not enough. If the pre-
sumed patient’s will is known and documented, this must
be respected. Additionally, the public on the research site
must be informed about the clinical trial (e.g. by notice on
a notice-board at the hospital or on a web-site).
The issue of whether data from patients who have
died can be used without formal authorization from
patients or representatives is addressed in neither the
Dutch, British, Italian and Austrian legislation. In the UK
researchers have generally relied on interpretation of the
provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 (http://ico-
cms.amaze.co.uk/documentUploads/use and disclosure
of health data.pdf) to legitimize such data use. The UK
also allows the use of an independent physician’s consent
in restricted circumstances, which would indeed be very
useful when judging whether or not sufﬁcient care has
been taken to seek consent otherwise (i.e. prior to death),
before using data without relatives’ agreement.
Synthesis
Dutch regulatory bodies have ruled that if the patient dies
shortly after randomization, and consent could not yet be
obtained, this forms no reason to abandon the requirement
to obtain deferred consent to use the data.
It is our convictionthat the obligationto obtain consent
should be respected as thoroughly as possible. However,
(a) the validity of proxy consent obtained during emer-
gencysituations can be ethically questioned;(b) using data
of patients who died and for whom deferred consent was
not yet obtained will not harm the patient or relatives (pro-899
videdthatappropriateconﬁdentialityandprivacymeasures
have been applied); (c) not using data will probably intro-
duce selection bias; (d) using data will beneﬁt future pa-
tients and society; (e) confronting bereavedrelatives to ob-
tain consent is an additional burden; and (f) an individual’s
decision about the privacy of their medical information is
not absolutely binding. We therefore think that it is inap-
propriate to enforce a strict rule that deferred consent must
be obtained from bereaved relatives of deceased patients.
Recommendations
In studies that use deferred consent, data should be used if
the patient dies before written (subject or proxy) consent
can be sought. To prevent unauthorized use of this excep-
tion of the obligation to obtain consent, we do, however,
recommend a time limit for the exception of 72 h (after
start of study procedures). Only if a patient dies after this
period and consent is not yet obtained, should data not be
used. If national legislation (e.g. in the UK) allows the use
of independentphysician’sconsent,consentto use the data
should be sought in this way. If not, as a sign of respect for
patient autonomy, we plea for a written notiﬁcation send
to the patients’ general practitioner and to relatives after
the early mourning phase in cases where data are being
used for study analyses despite the lack of deferred con-
sent [17]. Reports on all non-survivors without obtained
consentshould,in addition,be sent to the local ethics com-
mittees.
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